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Imagine this fictional situation: Jane Doe is a nurse who has worked
for the past five years at Hillstone Hospital. One of the requirements of her
job is the ability to move patients and equipment. However, a recent car
accident has left Jane with a severely injured back and she's been given a
ten-pound lifting restriction by her doctor and will need surgery in the
future. For all intents and purposes, she now qualifies as "disabled."
Hillstone cannot fire Jane just because her disability inhibits her from
performing all aspects for her job. The Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") was enacted to protect the employment rights of disabled
employees, like Jane. Therefore, Jane's disability status imposes certain
duties on Hillstone. Hillstone is obligated to find ways to accommodate
her disability so that she may maintain her employment status with the
hospital.
After considering various accommodations, such as a modified work
schedule, job restructuring, and other adjustments, both Jane and her
employer conclude she will be unable to perform the essential functions of
her job as a nurse in a way that also meets her lifting restriction. As a last
resort, Jane's employer may consider reassigning Jane to a different
position within the Hospital. Jane is aware of a comparable position in the
Hospital's pharmacy that is currently vacant. Jane meets the requirements
and qualifications set out in the job description, so she puts in her
application for reassignment. It is the Hospital's policy to fill all open
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positions with current employees under a merit-based system, which it calls
a "Best-Qualified Transfer Policy." Jane meets the minimum requirements
in the job posting, but a nondisabled employee, Amy, also applies. The
transfer would be a promotion for Amy. Amy has worked for the Hospital
for two years more than Jane, as well as received higher evaluation scores
from her supervisor during their overlapping years. Under the policy, it is
clear that Amy is the best applicant for the job. However, for Hillstone's
ultimate decision to be lawful, it must consider its obligations to the
disabled applicant under the ADA.
Because reassignment to another position is the only way to retain
Jane's employment with the Hospital, the employer must decide if the open
position should go to Jane automatically, or if it can use its legitimate
employer transfer policy as an excuse to transfer another employee to the
open position. The outcome would depend largely on the circuit court that
governs Hillstone Hospital. If Hillstone is in the Seventh Circuit, for
example, Hillstone must set aside its transfer policy and reassign Jane to
the vacant position instead of Amy, the better-qualified applicant. Amy
would then remain in her current position and need to wait until she can
apply for another job opening. The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand,
would allow the employer to ignore Jane's disability when making its
decision, considering the subjective factors of the "best-qualified" policy.
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit would allow the Hospital to hire Amy and
terminate Jane.
This Note discusses the disparate results of the ADA's reassignment
provision highlighted in the above hypothetical and suggests a solution to
the circuit split. Part I of this Note examines the burgeoning social
awareness of discriminatory treatment of disabled employees that underlies
the ADA and provides an overview of what constitutes "reasonable
accommodation" under the ADA. Particular focus on an employer's duty
to reassign a disabled employee will be supported by the Supreme Court's
evaluation of the role of preferential treatment. Part II presents the current
circuit split and parses through the prevailing arguments for when, if ever,
an employer must choose a minimally qualified employee over a more
qualified applicant for a position. For the purposes of this Note, this
situation will be termed "mandatory reassignment," in which an employer
must put aside its existing, facially neutral and non-discriminatory
employment policies to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant,
equivalent position. Part III addresses accusations that the ADA's
mandatory reassignment provision constitutes affirmative action in favor of
disabled employees, and considers whether the statute is justifiably
safeguarded from the constitutionally based issue.
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I. History of the ADA's Enactment and the Supreme Court's
Recognition of the Reassignment Provision.
A. The Call for Reasonable Accommodation
Under the command of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, all mistreated citizens should be able to turn to the legal
system to regain "equal protection under the law."'  The Constitution,
however, only gives the "protected" classification to certain subsets of the
population that are more vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex and national origin.2 However, the list is not
exhaustive. The Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to make
laws that apply the idea of "equal protection" when evidence indicates that
a particular group of people is systematically subject to discrimination.3 In
1990, Congress acted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact the ADA, a statute aimed to protect disabled individuals.4 Congress's
action was spurred by findings based on census data, national polls, and
other studies that showed disabled individuals were severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically and educationally when compared
with the rest of society.5 Disability discrimination "denie[s] people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous." 6
Accordingly, the ADA seeks to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
disabled individuals.
7
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. Id.
3. Id. at § 5.
4. ADA disabilities include both mental and physical medical conditions. A condition
does not need to be severe or permanent to be a disability. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") regulations provide a list of conditions that constitute disabilities:
deafness, blindness, an intellectual disability (formerly termed mental retardation), partially or
completely missing limbs or mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair, autism,
cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") infection,
multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia. Further, it doesn't
matter if disability was obtained in or outside of the parameters of employment. H.R. REP. No.
101-116, pt.4 at 22 (1989).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(6)-(7).
6. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2(a)(9) (emphasis added).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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Congress carefully drafted Title I of the ADA to focus on
discrimination that disabled individuals suffer in the workplace. 8 Title I
states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 9 In order to allow disabled individuals to participate on an
equal basis with nondisabled individuals, the ADA places an obligation on
employers to provide a reasonable accommodation to the "known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee," 10 unless the employer can demonstrate
"that the accommodation would impose an undue-hardship on the operation
of the business." 1
B. The Reasonable Accommodation Provision of the ADA Provides the
Option of Reassignment As a Last Resort
A "reasonable accommodation" is any modification or adjustment to
the job that enables the employee with a disability to enjoy an equal
employment opportunity.' 2  Although many individuals with disabilities
can apply for and perform jobs without any reasonable accommodations,
there may be workplace barriers that keep other disabled employees from
performing jobs that they could do if they had some form of
accommodation. These barriers may be physical, such as inaccessible
facilities or equipment, or procedural, such as rules concerning when work
is performed, when breaks are taken, or how essential or marginal functions
are performed. Reasonable accommodations must be provided to both
disabled job applicants and employees.
Determination of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is a
fact-intensive, case-by-case process. 13  Once an employee notifies the
8. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt.2 at 1 (1990). "People with disabilities fictionalized as
incompetent or helpless are typically denied a chance to prove they can do a job effectively, as
well as opportunities for promotion and for the reasonable accommodations they need to perform
on par with their peers. Intentionally or unintentionally, fictionalization has the potential effect of
setting workers with disabilities up for unequal treatment." Pamela M. Robert and Sharon L.
Harlan, Mechanisms of Disability Discrimination in Large Bureaucratic Organizations:
Ascriptive Inequalities in Workplace, 47 SOC. Q. 4, 607 (2006).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
10. See id. A "qualified individual with a disability" is one who can perform the essential
functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Id. § 12111(8).
11. Id. § 12112(a).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (2001).
13. See generally EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA at
16, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7391, 7399 (1996).
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employer about a needed accommodation,14 the employer and employee are
then required to engage in an interactive process, first turning to the nature
of the position the disabled employee currently holds, looking to its
purpose, tasks, and essential functions. 15 The term "essential functions"
targets the "fundamental job duties of the employment position," not those
that are "marginal" in nature. Therefore, when a qualified disabled
individual seeks provision of a reasonable accommodation, the employer
should first determine which functions of the position in question are
absolutely necessary to adequately perform the job. Written job
descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
position are considered as relevant, though not conclusive, evidence. Other
relevant factors include the amount of time spent performing the function,
consequences of the employee not performing the task, and the experience
of past and present employees in the position.
Once the essential functions are determined, the employer should
consult with the disabled person regarding the limitations imposed by the
disability and possible accommodations to overcome those limitations.
Congress provides an illustrative, though non-exhaustive, list of examples
of reasonable accommodations:
(a) making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and useable by individuals
with disabilities; and
(b) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
16
To assess what accommodation would be reasonable, an employer
may start by considering accommodations that would allow the disabled
employee to remain in his or her current position. Options include making
existing facilities readily accessible-for example, if an employee requires
wheelchair access, the employer could build ramps to make the workspace
more navigable. An employer could also make appropriate adjustments to
14. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
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the employee's workspace-for example, if sitting at a desk for a long
period of time causes an employee back pain, the employer could
accommodate the disability by installing a standing or adjustable desk.
In addition, an employer can consider whether modified work
schedules would be a reasonable accommodation by adjusting departure or
arrival times, providing periodic breaks, providing additional unpaid leave
or allowing the employee to use accrued paid leave. 7 For example, if a
disabled employee is unable to come to the office due to doctors'
appointments, the employer could allow the employee to work remotely or
start a workday later to accommodate morning appointments.
The option of job restructuring allows an employer to remove certain
non-essential tasks from a disabled employee's work requirements. The
employer may reallocate or redistribute the marginal functions of a job by
exchanging marginal functions of a job that cannot be performed by a
person with a disability for marginal job functions performed by other
employees that the disabled individual can perform. For example, if there
are two secretaries and one has a speech impairment, and speaking on the
phone is a marginal job function, the secretary with the speech impairment
could take on the filing of the other secretary in exchange for the non-
speech impaired secretary answering both phones.
Reassignment may be used as a last resort.' 8 However, the scope of the
employer's duty to make such an accommodation has been subject to
substantial debate. Though the ADA does not explicitly state the parameters
for "reassignment,"' 19 the EEOC has provided guidelines for its application.
The EEOC takes the position that when an employee is unable to perform the
essential functions of his or her current position, 20 either with or without an
accommodation, the employer must consider reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation. When reassignment is deemed necessary, the disabled
employee first has the burden to "show that an accommodation seems
reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.",21 Then, an
17. Id.; see, e.g., Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 172 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that a modified schedule is a form of reasonable accommodation).
18. See H.R.REP. No. 101-485(I), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345
("Efforts should be made, however, to accommodate an employee in the position that he or she
was hired to fill before reassignment is considered.").
19. See, e.g., Carlos S. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 953 (2004) (recognizing the
controversy surrounding the reassignment provision and distinguishing reasonable
accommodation from affirmative action).
20. The term "reassignment" implies the presence of an existing job that the person holds,
such that the person must therefore be an existing employee, not a job applicant.
21. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,402 (2002).
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employer must reassign an individual to a vacant, equivalent position that is
equivalent as long as the employee is qualified for the position-unless the
employer can prove the reassignment would prove an undue hardship.22
Each emphasized term will be defined in turn:
To be "vacant," the reassignment position must be either currently
available or will become available within a reasonable amount of time.23
The employer may determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether an
occupied position will become available in a short amount of time, and will
be considered vacant if the employer has posted a notice or announcement
seeking applications for that position.24
To be "equivalent," the reassignment position must offer the disabled
employee opportunities comparable to the previous position.25  The
position may be comparable in various factors such as pay, status, benefits,
geographical location, and opportunities for advancement. 26 Because the
core purpose of the ADA is to enable an employee with a disability to
enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment,27 it is not enough for
the previous and reassignment position to have similar pay. For example,
in the Ninth Circuit case Cripe v. City of San Jose,28 a disabled police
officer was unable to perform in his previous capacity, and was reassigned
to a position with "degrading conditions" that did not offer the same
opportunities for promotion, despite having comparable salaries and
benefits. 29 The court held the reassignment violated the ADA, because the
reassignment position was not "equivalent.
30
To be "qualified" for the reassignment position, an employee must be
able to satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-
related requirements of the position, and be able to perform the essential
functions of the new position, with or without reasonable accommodation.31
22. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA at 16, 8 FEP
Manual (BNA) 405:7391, 7399 (1996).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. "Reassignment may not be used to limit, segregate, or otherwise discriminate against
employees with disabilities by forcing reassignments to undesirable positions or to designated
offices of facilities." Ruth Colker, The Law of Disability Discrimination Handbook: Statutes and
Regulatory Guidance 127, (7th ed., 2011).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2014); see also Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d
89 (2d Cir. 1999).
27. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
28. Cripe v. Cty. of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 893 (9th Cir. 2001).
29. Id. at 883.
30. Id. at 881.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); see, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & Eastern R. Co., 327 F.3d
707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Though there is no obligation for the employer to assist the individual to
become qualified, an employer must provide training that is normally
provided to anyone hired for or transferred to the position.
32
Once an accommodation, such as reassignment, is determined to be
reasonable on its face, the analysis then turns to whether the
accommodation would pose an "undue hardship." To ensure the "full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" of
disabled individuals, the ADA places the costs of accommodation on the
employer.33 Therefore, it is the employer's burden to prove undue hardship
as a defense to an otherwise reasonable accommodation.
The inquiry into whether an undue hardship exists is a fact-intensive
analysis of economic factors listed in the statute:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under
this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable
accommodation; the number of persons employed at
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or
the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with
respect to the number of its employees; the number,
type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of
the workforce of such entity; the geographic
separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
34
An undue hardship is generally defined as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense" or that would be substantially disruptive
or would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.
35
When determining whether an accommodation would constitute an undue
hardship, a court could consider factors including the nature and cost of the
accommodation at issue, the overall financial resources, size and impact of
the accommodation on the facility involved and any applicable parent
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(8); see, e.g., EEOC v. Humison-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024,
1028 (7th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. § 12111(10).
35. Id.
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entity.36  Thus, a large corporation may be required to make an
accommodation that would be deemed unreasonable for a smaller business.
Generally, only the employer's net costs are to be considered when
determining whether provision of an accommodation would create an
undue hardship, not the opportunity costs on other employees.
The standard for proving undue burden is high, such that the employer
must bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating a disabled
employee. 37 For example, if the reassignment might "slow the employer's
business or require the employer to hire outside employees to do the work,
the accommodation comes at more than de minimis cost to the employer."
38
To mitigate against a potential undue burden, the employee may seek cost-
sharing alternatives. Even if a particular reasonable accommodation would
result in undue hardship, the employer must pay for the portion of the
accommodation that would not cause an undue hardship so long as the
employee or other source can pay for the remainder of the cost of
accommodation. 39
C. Potential Conflict Between "Neutral" Employer Policies and the
Reassignment Provision
A significant part of the debate over the scope of reassignment hinges
on an employer's choice to use company policies that limit the employee's
right to switch jobs. Such policies include "best-qualified" merit-based
transfer policies and seniority systems. The policies are considered to be
"neutral" because they do not facially distinguish between employees based
on disability.40 Tension between the ADA and an employer's right to
dictate the way it conducts business arises when a reassignment would
conflict with the established company policy. Employees argue that
employers must prove an undue hardship in order to overcome the ADA's
reasonable accommodation mandate requiring employers to make
36. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Rachel Schneller Ziegler, Safe, but Not Sound: Limiting Safe
Harbor Immunity for Health and Disability Insurers and Self-Insured Employers Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 101 MICH. L. REV. 840, 868 (2002) ("The burden of proving
undue hardship rests with the defendant because the undue hardship defense is an affirmative
defense to a claim of discrimination under the ADA.").
37. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, Pt. 2., at 68 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116 at 36 (1989); cf
Humison-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1028 (conceding that "[i]t is true that antidiscrimination
statutes impose costs on employers").
38. Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1416 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
39. H.R.REP.NO. 101-116,at37 (1989).
40. Cheryl L. Anderson, "Neural" Employer Policies and the ADA: The Implications of
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 11 (2002).
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modifications or exceptions to the policies.41 Employers, on the other
hand, argue there is no need to prove undue hardship in the face of a
"neutral" policy.42
The legislative history of the ADA indicates seniority systems "may
be considered as a factor" in determining whether a requested reassignment
is a reasonable accommodation.43 The Supreme Court made explicit that
even the "neutral" seniority policy is not a determinative factor or a per se
bar to reassignment accommodation. 44
1. The Supreme Court's Precedent Dictates That "Reassignment" Requires
Preferential Treatment.
The Supreme Court, for the first and only time, addressed the scope of
the reassignment provision of the ADA in U.S. Airways v. Barnett.45 The
employer U.S. Airways enforced a well-established seniority system,
electing the most senior employee bidding on a position to be transferred.4 6
After ten years of employment, Barnett, an employee, became disabled
after injuring his back while working in a cargo-handling position. 47 U.S.
Airways temporarily allowed Barnett to utilize his seniority and transfer to
a less physically demanding open position in the mailroom. 48 When U.S.
Airways later decided to open the disabled employee's position to seniority
bidding, several coworkers with greater seniority than Barnett applied.49
Barnett requested to stay in his new position.5° U.S. Airways contemplated
the request for five months, but ultimately could not grant this request
under the company's seniority system and fired Barnett. Bamett sued
under the ADA, alleging that U.S. Airways did not provide a reasonable
accommodation.
41. See, e.g., Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1027 (arguing on employee's behalf that
an employer was required to reassign an employee despite "neutral" policy requiring competitive
selection unless the employer could show the reassignment posed an undue hardship).
42. See, e.g., Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 63 (1990) (noting that if a collective bargaining
agreement reserves certain jobs based on seniority, this may be considered as a factor in
determining whether reassignment of an employee with less seniority is a reasonable
accommodation).
44. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002).
45. Id. at 391.
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In its analysis, the Supreme Court looked to Congress's intent for the
ADA's reassignment provision and boundaries of its application. The
Barnett Court used the two-part test that governs reassignments under the
ADA. First, the test requires the employee to prove that the type of
accommodation sought seems ordinarily reasonable. Then, if the employee
proves that the accommodation does seem ordinarily reasonable, the
employer can only overcome the reassignment obligation by showing
"special circumstances"--typically case specific-that demonstrate the
accommodation would pose an "undue hardship" in the context of the
employer's operations. 51 Each prong will be discussed, in turn.
U.S. Airways argued that requiring an employer to violate a disability-
neutral rule would give the employee with a disability a preference above
nondisabled employees, and therefore was a valid reason to deny
accommodation.52 The United States Supreme Court disagreed.53 Because
the ultimate goal under disability law is to provide disabled individuals
with equality of opportunity, the Supreme Court found preferential
treatment is a legitimate and necessary component of reasonable
accommodation law.54 Justice Breyer noted that the ADA inherently
expects neutral rules to be modified by turning to the definition of
"accommodation. 55  By definition, the very word "accommodation"
requires an employer to treat a disabled employee differently, i.e.,
preferentially. 56 Therefore in order to provide disabled employees with
preference, employers must treat disabled employees differently from
nondisabled employees because disabled individuals are systemically
disadvantaged.57
Under the ADA, the employer cannot simply disregard the protected
trait and treat the employee with that trait in the same way that the
employer treats all other employees because the disabled employee is
already not similarly situated to other employees.58 The ADA recognizes
that an accommodation is often required in order for an employee with a
51. Id. at405.
52. Id. at 398.
53. Justice O'Connor's belief in a fact-specific inquiry regarding contractual enforceability
suggests she thereby agreed that a disability-neutral rule does not preclude an accommodation
request. See id. at 1526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Congress recognized that discrimination against individuals with disabilities results
from action as well as inaction. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2 at 29; see also Ball, supra note 19, at
990.
55. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Ball, supra note 19, at 990.
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disability to be similarly situated to others. 59 The Supreme Court found
that providing preferential treatment in order to reasonably accommodate a
disabled employee is consistent with congressional intent and "cannot, in
and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not
'reasonable."' 60  Moreover, neutral office assignment rules without the
application of preference would not accomplish the "intended objective. 6 1
Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that Barnett's request for
reassignment satisfied the first prong of the test because it was reasonable
on its face, even if it required providing Barnett preferential treatment over
other employees who desired the same position. In so finding, the Supreme
Court established that preferential treatment is inherent in the proper
application of the ADA.
2. The Seniority System Exception Has a Narrow Application.
After finding that preferential treatment is inherent in the ADA, the
Supreme Court turned to whether an employer could be excused from
offering the facially reasonable reassignment. Though the Supreme Court
did not find that Barnett's request would pose a high financial burden on
U.S. Airways, the Court acknowledged U.S. Airways' argument that the
reassignment would be unreasonable because the reassignment conflicted
with the company's seniority system. The Court held that generally, it is
not "reasonable accommodation" if an employer would be required to
violate a unilaterally imposed seniority system in order to reassign a
disabled employee to a vacant position. 62 The Supreme Court explained
the underlying reason for the seniority system exception as recognizing
objective elements and social elements such as uniform treatment and
management of expectations of all employees. 63 The Court reasoned that
employees' reliance on a fair, uniform application of a seniority system
created job security and opportunities for "steady and predictable
advancement based on objective standards." 64 The Court then went on to
conclude the expectations created in a seniority system are comparable to
property rights.65 The idea that seniority systems "encourage employees to
59. Id.
60. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 391.
63. Id. at 404 ("[T]he typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by
creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.").
64. Id.
65. Id.
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invest in the employing company, accepting less than their value to the firm
early in their careers in return for greater benefit in later years.,
66
Nonetheless, a seniority system is not a per se bar on the reasonable
accommodation provision. If a requested accommodation involving a
particular job assignment would violate rules of the seniority system, the
seniority system will typically trump the reassignment unless the employee
presents evidence of special circumstances surrounding the particular case
that demonstrate assignment is nonetheless reasonable. 67  Special
circumstances include situations where an employer unilaterally changes
the reassignment systems with frequency or the seniority system contains
multiple exceptions, thereby reducing an employee's expectations that the
system will be followed.68
Overall, the case resulted in a holding for U.S. Airways, creating a
narrow exception to the ADA's reasonable accommodation obligation
based on objective employee expectations and consequences of failure to
fulfill those expectations. No other employer policy can trump the duty to
reassign.
II. Circuit Split: Mandatory Reassignment Versus Mere
Consideration for Reassignment
The lower courts disagree on the scope of the reassignment provision
when the reassignment would violate a "neutral" company policy, such as
those that are merit-based. The divide is based on statutory interpretation
of the ADA, policy concerns, business interests, and Barnett's grant of a
seniority system exception. Although the Supreme Court held that it would
generally be unreasonable for an employer to modify its seniority policy
when faced with reassignment of a disabled employee, the lower federal
courts are split on what to do with "facially neutral" employer policies that
would grant the employer the right to hire the most qualified applicant for a
vacant position over a minimally qualified disabled individual.
Notably, the Eighth Circuit has held an employer is "not required to
reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a
reassignment would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the
employer to hire the most qualified candidate., 69 This line of reasoning
suggests employers shouldn't have to ignore facially neutral policy in favor
of a disabled employee. The Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, on the
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
68. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 392.
69. Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir. 2007).
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other hand, have held that "reassignment" presumes some affirmative
obligation on the part of the employer to actually assign the employee to a
new position, not force the employee to compete against a pool of
applicants for the position.7° Mandatory reassignment would ensure the
disabled employee is given the preferential treatment that Barnett
established is inherent in the ADA.
A. The ADA's Statutory Language and Legislative History Favor
Mandatory Reassignment over Mere Consideration.
When considering the two interpretations of what constitutes
"reasonable accommodation" for the reassignment provision, the Seventh,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that reassignment, when appropriate, is
mandatory.71 Accordingly, a "disabled employee has a right in fact to the
reassignment ' 72 because reasonably accommodating disabled individuals
requires "something more than merely allowing a disabled person to
compete equally with the rest of the world for a vacant position." 73 The
ADA's reassignment mandate means that a disabled employee is entitled to
placement in a vacant, equivalent position provided that the disabled
employee is qualified for the job. In fact, the EEOC even stated in its
guidance: "otherwise, reassignment would be of little value and would not
be implemented as Congress intended." 74
Simply allowing a disabled employee to be considered among a pool
of similarly qualified applicants for a vacant position does not satisfy the
reassignment requirement under the ADA, because it fails to provide the
preferential treatment mandated by the Barnett precedent. For example, a
merit-based transfer policy could allow an employer to reject the transfer
application of a disabled employee in favor of an incrementally "better-
qualified" nondisabled candidate. Failure to give preference to disabled
employees over nondisabled employees would mark the ADA a nullity,
75
70. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied 133 S. Ct.
2743 (2013); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999); Aka v. Wash. Hosp.
Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
71. See Duvall v. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, L.P., 607 F.3d 1225, 1260 (10th Cir.
2010) ("[The] employer must offer the employee the vacant position."); see also United Airlines,
Inc., 693 F.3d at 761 ("[The] ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees
with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified.").
72. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1165; see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1284.
74. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, THE U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Oct. 2002),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance].
75. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 98 (1989) ("To provide equal opportunity for a person with a
disability will sometimes require additional actions and costs than those required to provide
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since even without the ADA an employee with a disability may have the
76
right to compete for a vacant position. The Supreme Court in Barnett
recognized that forcing disabled employees to compete for their
reassignment with those who have a natural advantage is a "thoughtless
action... that far too often bar[s] those with disabilities from participating
fully in the Nation's life, including the workplace. 77  Without this
understanding, the ADA would have no enforcement weight to ensure that
employers remain accountable for their duty to accommodate their disabled
employees' special needs. Moreover, granting that mere consideration
given by merit-based policies and interpreting the statute as not to require
preference would render the ADA meaningless.
A closer look at the statutory language and legislative history reveals
that reasonable reassignment means an employee is entitled to a
reassignment and does not need to compete for it.78 The Supreme Court
has noted that "[j]udges should hesitate to read statutory provisions as
'surplusage,"' and thus, an analysis of the plain meaning of the words used
to construct the statute is relevant to determine the intended meaning.79
When interpreting the language of the statute, the Tenth and D.C. Circuits
focused on the word "reassign." Those courts stated, "the word 'reassign'
must mean more than allowing an employee to apply for a job on the same
basis as anyone else ... [T]he core word 'assign' implies some active
effort on the part of the employer., 80 The D.C. Circuit explained that an
employee who is allowed to compete for jobs precisely like any other
applicant has not been "reassigned.", 81  Reassignment implies employer
action-appointing the employee to the position.82  Competition implies
employee action-getting the job through his own power.83 An employer
who truly reassigns a disabled employee has placed him in a new position,
access to a person without a disability."); see also Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167 ("It would be
cold comfort for a disabled employee to know that his or her application was 'considered' but that
he or she was nevertheless still out of a job.")
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o). See S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 33 (1989) ("If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the essential
functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person
is qualified may prevent the employee from being out of work and the employer from losing a
valuable worker.").
77. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
78. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
79. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Roche
Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011).
80. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164 (quotingAka, 156 F.3d at 1304).
81. Aka, 156 F.3dat 1302.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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with no consideration of other applicants, more or less qualified.84 Thus,
the plain meaning of "[re]assign" supports the conclusion that Congress
must have meant something more than a disabled employee's ability to
compete equally for another position on the same terms as any other
member of the general public.85
The ADA's inclusion of the term "qualified," rather than "best-
qualified," requires an employer to set aside a qualification-based system
for the purpose of the reassignment provision. As discussed previously in
this Note, the term "qualified" simply requires an employee to be able to
perform the essential functions outlined in the employer's job description.
Requiring anything more than the minimum requirements set by the
employer, such as requiring the reassigned employee to be the best
qualified employee for the vacant job, is "judicial gloss unwarranted by the
statutory language or its legislative history.' 86  Allowing "mere
consideration" would amend the statutory phrase "qualified individual with
a disability" into "best qualified individual, notwithstanding the
disability. 87 An employer's conflicting transfer policy does not excuse the
employer from providing mandatory reassignment to a disabled employee
because the ADA does not require that the employee be the "best qualified"
employee for the vacant position.
88
A disabled employee need only be minimally qualified for mandatory
reassignment to be reasonable. The Tenth Circuit held in Smith v. Midland
Brake, that an employee has a right to reassignment so long as the disabled
employee is minimally qualified to perform the position's essential
functions. 89 In that case, Robert Smith worked for Midland Brake, Inc. for
nearly seven years in the company's light assembly department, putting
together and testing small air valve components of air brakes for large
vehicles. 90 Smith developed chronic dermatitis due to his frequent contact
with various chemicals, solvents, and irritants.91 Midland Brake fired
Smith because it could not accommodate Smith's chronic skin sensitivity in
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1304. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74; see also Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 902-03 (D. Ariz. 1997) ("[A]llowing the plaintiff to compete for jobs
open to the public is no accommodation at all.").
86. Smithv. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10thCir. 1999).
87. Id. at 1167-68.
88. 56 Fed. Reg. 35726, 1991 WL 304269 (July 26, 1991).
89. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1160.
90. Id. at 1164.
91. Id. at 1160.
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the light assembly department. 92 Smith asserted there were various other
positions he was qualified for but were instead offered to other applicants.93
The Tenth Circuit noted that Congress defined discrimination to
include failure to accommodate disability, including failure to reassign to a
vacant position.94  It characterized the "right to compete" approach as
rendering the reassignment provision "a hollow promise." 95 So long as
Smith was minimally qualified for a position, reassignment should have
been mandatory to avoid termination.96  The Circuit established that
reassignment under the ADA requires automatically awarding a position to
a qualified disabled employee, despite the merits of other applicants and
despite an employer's policies to select applicants based on those merits.
97
Since the employer sets the qualification requirements, the ADA still
requires the disabled employee to be minimally qualified for the position
per the employer's chosen standards. The qualification provision "intends
to reaffirm that this legislation does not undermine an employer's ability to
choose and maintain qualified workers.",98 The ADA honors an employer's
rights to choose employment standards by noting that "if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants
for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job." 99 A disabled employee is eligible for mandatory
reassignment because so long as the employee can perform the essential
functions, the transfer does not erode an employer's ability to select and
maintain a highly skilled workforce.
Mandatory reassignment is required even if reassignment would
prevent a more qualified applicant from being hired. 1°° The Seventh
Circuit's holding in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center requires an
employer to reassign the disabled employee over more qualified
nondisabled employees.101 In that case, Etim Aka ("Aka") had been
employed for over nineteen years as an orderly at Washington Hospital
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1168-69.
95. Id. at 1176 (explaining "a hollow promise" means requiring only consideration for
vacant positions).
96. Id. at 1164.
97. Id.
98. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 55 (1990).
99. 42U.S.C.§ 12111(8).
100. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
101. Id.
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Center.10 2 Aka underwent a heart bypass surgery, and was told by his
doctor that he could not work at a job that required more than a light or
moderate level of extension. 10 3 Aka was subsequently unable to perform
the essential job functions of an orderly, such as transporting patients and
medical supplies, which required heavy lifting and pushing. 1°4 Aka,
equipped with a college degree, master's degree in business, and public
administration in health service management, applied to several vacant
positions at the company. 10 5 The company required Aka apply to open
positions within the company for transfer.'0 6 Aka applied to vacant File
Clerk positions, for which he was minimally qualified, but was rejected in
favor of more qualified applicants. 10 7 The Court held that Aka was entitled
to the positions in which he was at least minimally qualified, regardless of
the qualifications other applicants may possess because he need not
compete for the position. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the ADA already
prohibits discrimination based on disability in job application procedures,
which would render the reassignment provision redundant if it is read
merely as permission to apply for the vacant position.108 These courts
conclude that Congress has already placed restrictions on the scope of the
duty to reassign that are designed to ensure that the employer's business is
not unduly disrupted, and "[i]f further limitations are to be sought, they
must come from Congress.' ' 9
To temper the obligations of employers when faced with providing
reassignment to a disabled employee, Congress included other specific
terms in the ADA to serve as statutory safeguards for the employer in order
to mitigate any claim of hardship. In the House of Representative's 1990
Report, the Committee made clear that the "vacancy" requirement does not
means the employer is required to "bump" another employee out of a
position to create a vacancy. 110 Had Congress intended that disabled
employees be treated exactly like other job applicants, there would have
been no need for the report to go on to explain that "bumping" another




106. Id. at 1287.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1304.
109. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999) (summarizing
statutory limitations on the duty to reassign, including vacancy of position sought, qualification of
the employee, and defense of undue hardship).
110. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
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employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required."'
Therefore, a nondisabled employee is not in jeopardy of losing his or her
current position in order to accommodate a disabled employee.
Additionally, vacant implies the position is already established within a
company, such that the employer is not required to create a new position to
accommodate the disabled employee.
Assuming there is more than one vacancy for which the employee is
qualified, the employer must place the individual in the position that comes
closest to the employee's current position in terms of duties, status, and
benefits. While reassignment may not be used to force employees with
disabilities into undesirable positions,12 the employer only has to reassign
a disabled employee to the most reasonable of the positions available. On
the one hand, an employer may be liable for failure to accommodate an
employee if it had only offered her positions that would have reduced her
salary and benefits or her seniority despite evidence that a comparable
position was available. On the other, an employer may reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position with lower pay if the only other position
available was that of the CEO, for example. The flexibility of the
"equivalent" term, weighed on a case-by-case basis, takes into account the
employer's scope to accommodate a disabled employee that would not
interfere with the integrity of the company structure.
B. "Best Qualified" Is Not Equivalent to a Seniority Exception.
An employer's "neutral" competition-based transfer policy is not the
same as a seniority system. While employers often prefer to hire the
applicant that is best qualified for the particular position, "the violation of a
best-qualified selection policy does not involve the property-rights and
administrative concerns (and resulting burdens) presented by the violation
of a seniority policy."
' n3
However, the Eighth Circuit disagrees. In Huber v. Wal-Mart, Pam
Huber was a grocery order filler until she became permanently disabled
when she injured her arm while at work. She then sought reassignment to
an open position as a router.1 14 Huber and Wal-Mart both agreed the router
position was a vacant position within the company, and was comparable to
the filler position she previously held. 15 Wal-Mart had a "policy to fill
111. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
112. EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(o).
113. EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied 133 S. Ct.
2743 (2013).
114. Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007).
115. Id.
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vacant job positions with the most qualified applicant,"'1 16 and though
Huber was qualified, a more qualified coworker also wanted the position.' 
17
Wal-Mart refused to reassign Huber, and instead gave the vacant position
to the more qualified employee per Wal-Mart's Associate Job Transfer
Program. Wal-Mart placed Huber in an alternate position, which was
lesser in pay, paying $6.20 per hour as opposed to her former $13.00 per
hour. The Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of the employer.
The Huber court1 18 rationalized its holding that the ADA's
reassignment provision requires the employer to consider reassignment-
not effectuate it, by comparing the qualification-based system to Barnett's
seniority exception. n 9 It held that as with seniority systems, when a
reassignment conflicts with a qualification-based transfer policy,
employees must disprove the presumption that the reassignment is
unreasonable. 120 The court reasoned that undermining qualification-based
policies "subvert[s] other, more qualified applicants for the job. 121
The holding compared seniority policies that were granted as a very
narrow exception to the ADA in Barnett to merit-based policies. In
Barnett, the Court said that the advantages of a seniority system are that it
"provides important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling,
employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment ... these benefits include
job security and an opportunity for steady and predictable advancement
based on objective standards.122 In fact, "the length of time an employee
is associated with a particular company, divisions, or position provides a
fair, objective alternative criterion for making" decisions that can be
understood and respected by employees and management. 123 For example,
the seniority rights create "due process" for employee expectations about
management decisions, by mitigating arbitrary decisions and nepotism in





120. Id. at 484.
121. Id.
122. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Susan Gardner & James F. Morgan, The Supreme Court to Decide: Seniority Rights or
Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 52 LABOR L.J.
234, 235 (2001).
124. Carl Gersuny, Origins of Seniority Provisions in Collective Bargaining, 33 LABOR L.J.
518, 519 (1982).
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by ensuring economic security in times of layoffs or workplace
reorganization. 125
The Eighth Circuit attempted to stretch the advantages of a seniority
system to apply equally to qualification-based transfer policies, such that
qualification-based policies tie to the flourishing of a business in terms of
profits, overall performance, and protection for employees. 126  It would
then follow that a best-qualified transfer policy goes further in protecting
employees than a seniority system because it guarantees that employees are
awarded based on merit and skill. The holding in Huber suggests that
frustrating competition-based policies negatively affects individual
employees who are best qualified for positions, 127 because employees under
these systems have an expectation that they will receive uniform and
predictable treatment when they apply for a position.128 Along that line of
analysis, employees rely upon this safeguard to ensure transparent
decision-making and fair chances for advancement1 29 and undermining
qualification-based transfer policies hurts the workforce.
Despite the Eighth Circuit's conclusion, an employer's neutral merit-
based policy is far too attenuated in that it does not grant employees the
same significant benefits seniority systems provide in the workplace,
including pay increases, promotions, and job assignments that provide
certain employee rights and expectations. 130  The benefits present under a
seniority system "which justify the presumption that seniority rules trump
the right to reassignment, are either not present, or are sufficiently
diminished," with respect to other neutral selection processes.131 Simply
because a policy is legitimate does not mean it is entitled to a heightened
deference, if such heightened deference fails to reflect the text, specific
intent and spirit of the ADA.
125. Benjamin Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1962).
126. See Taylor Brooke Concannon, Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater: Taking
the Seventh Circuits Decision in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. Too Far, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 613,
638. See also Fischbach v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing that "the court must respect the employer's unfettered discretion to choose among
qualified candidates").
127. Concannon, supra note 126, at 638.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Gardner, supra note 123, at 235.
131. Jared Hager, Symposium, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and
Antitrust Law: Picking up the Seven Ten Split by Pinning Down the Reasonableness of
Reassignment After Barnett, 87 MINN. L. REV. 2063, 2090 (2003).
Spring 2016]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Compared to objective criteria under a seniority system, a "best
qualified" process is susceptible to multiple levels of subjectivity. 13 2
Awarding a position based on merit and skill is an inherently subjective
analysis, in which one person's evaluation may differ from another's.
Therefore, the merit-based policy fails to provide consistent expectation
rights. For these reasons, among others, the lone Eighth Circuit's attempt
to insert a qualification-based policy under Barnett's narrow seniority
exception is an inadequate application of the ADA.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit based much of its rationale on the
Seventh Circuit's then-standing opinion in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling,
Inc.133  In EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., plaintiff Nancy Houser
originally worked for employer, Humiston-Keeling, in a warehouse
position requiring employees to pick health and pharmaceutical products
off an assembly line. She subsequently injured her right arm and could no
longer perform the essential functions of the picker position, even with
accommodations. Houser then applied and was interviewed for a total of
eight office jobs within the company. The positions were vacant and
comparable to her previous position. Yet, in each case the employer
selected another employee to transfer into the position.
The Huber134 court's reliance on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
Humiston-Keeling,135 which was decided before Barnett, that emphasized
the "legitimate and nondiscriminatory" or neutral nature of a policy to hire
the most qualified candidate, is misplaced. Humiston-Keeling was
overturned by the 2012 post-Barnett decision of EEOC v. United
Airlines.136  The Seventh Circuit expressly reversed its decision in
Humiston-Keeling in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Barnett,
holding that the "ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint
employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are
qualified." 137 Therefore, a merit-based transfer policy cannot fit into the
narrow seniority policy of Barnett.
132. John E. Murray & Christopher J. Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and the
ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 721, 731-42 (2000).
133. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000).
134. Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007).
135. Id.
136. EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied 133 S. Ct.
2743 (2013).
137. Id. ("[W]e now make clear that Humiston-Keeling did not survive Barnett.").
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C. A Call for Supreme Court Review
The Supreme Court nearly had an opportunity to resolve the circuit
split regarding mandatory reassignment under the ADA. On December 7,
2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Huber case, limiting the
issue to whether the employer should mandatorily reassign a disabled
employee, or require her to compete with other applicants for the vacant
position. 138 Unfortunately, the Court dismissed the writ after Huber and
Wal-Mart settled the dispute, and employers are left to struggle with
remaining issues of the circuit split.139 If left unresolved, the circuit split
may encourage businesses to adopt inconsistent reassignment policies if
they operate in multiple states across different circuits.140 For example, if a
company fails to reassign a minimally qualified disabled employee in the
Seventh, Tenth, or D.C. Circuit, then it would have discriminated against
the employee. However, if the same company made the same decision in
the Eight Circuit, its decision would not violate the ADA. Ultimately, if a
company operates in multiple circuits, the split may result in forum
shopping or "vigorous jurisdiction-based legal battles.' 41  Given the
continuing circuit split, it is likely the Supreme Court will eventually need
to address the tension between an employer's right to create and adhere to
neutral hiring policies and a disabled employee's rights to reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.
III. Debunking the Threat of Mandatory Reassignment's
"Affirmative Action" Rhetoric
The statutory text and legislative history of the ADA makes clear
preferential treatment is an inherent component of the statute's mandatory
reassignment provision. Criticism, however, has focused on the lingering
social consequences of mandatory reassignment. In the majority opinion of
Barnett, Justice Breyer alluded to an accommodation being unreasonable
because of its effect on third parties, i.e., fellow employees. 4 2  By
mandating reassignment, the interests of fellow employees are necessarily
affected. Some courts have noted that mandatory reassignment creates a
missed opportunity for a nondisabled employee, i.e., a disabled employee
138. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 552 U.S. 1074 (2007).
139. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 552 U.S. 1136 (2008).
140. Nicholas A. Dorsey, Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split and
Need for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 468 (2009).
141. Id. Multi-jurisdictional businesses, like Wal-Mart, could be sued in ajurisdiction where
the disabled employee works, or at the corporate headquarters. Id. This makes it difficult for a
business to predict its exposure to liability. Id.
142. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,400 (2002).
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would automatically be given a reassignment over a nondisabled employee
who also desired the reassignment position.143 Or, if an employee knows
she or he may not be able to obtain a vacant position because a disabled
employee will be reassigned to that position, the nondisabled employee
may be discouraged from applying for the vacant positions because their
expectations of uniform, consistent treatment have been upset. 144
Accordingly, a central argument against mandatory reassignment
relies on "affirmative action" rhetoric, suggesting mandatory reassignment
would morph the ADA into an affirmative action statute. 45 The crux of the
affirmative action argument under the ADA is that mandatory reassignment
would give disabled employees positions purely on the basis of their
disability. Requiring an employer to reassign a minimally qualified
individual because he or she is disabled is "giving a job to someone solely
on the basis of his status as a member of a statutorily protected group."' 146
The argument continues by asserting this "favoritism" gives unwarranted
advantages to disabled employees that go beyond the accommodations
within the scope of the ADA. At a basic level, the ADA affirmative action
rhetoric is: But for the disability, a position given to a disabled individual
would have otherwise gone to a nondisabled individual. This argument
interprets the statutory rights under the ADA in a way parallel to Title VII,
but is not quite right. Such an argument blindly ignores important
differences between mandatory reassignment and the constitutional issues
of affirmative action.
To begin, we must recognize the difference between obligations
placed on state actors and private employers. When a state actor gives a
preference, affirmative action becomes a constitutional issue under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Under the Equal
Protection Clause, "affirmative action" represents a broad array of
government policies, ranging from government expenditures to assist
certain underrepresented races to preferential treatment in hiring or
143. See, e.g., Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007).
144. Edward Hood Dawson, III, Mandated Reassignment for the Minimally Qualified, 117
W. VA. L. REV. 735, 762 (2014).
145. See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1045, 1048-49 (2000) (noting that "(n)egative affirmative action rhetoric has begun
to creep into recent ADA decisions, particularly when the accommodation at issue is
reassignment to a vacant position"); see also Huber, 486 F.3d at 484 (The "ADA does not require
[the employer] to turn away a superior applicant for [the position] in order to give the position to
[the disabled employee]" because doing so would be "affirmative action with a vengeance.").
146. Huber, 486 F.3d at 484 (quoting Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029) (overruled by
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012)).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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admissions. 148 Public actors must take extraordinary care when acting in
accordance with the "core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment" to "do
away with all governmentally imposed discriminations based on race."
149
For a state actor's race-based hiring policy, for example, to be
constitutional it must pass the muster of a stringent standard to justify the
"means chosen by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes."' 150
Even if an affirmative action plan is found to be constitutional, it can only
be enacted for a predetermined set of time. 
1 51
When a private employer chooses to use affirmative action policies
under Title VII to make up for an imbalance in the workplace, it's not
necessarily a constitutional issue,152 though these plans must also be
temporary in nature so as not to violate Title VII. 153 Generally, private
employers are given larger leeway than government actors to implement
policies and hiring practices that provide preference to a certain
underrepresented classes of race or gender. 154 A private employer seeking
to justify adoption of affirmative action plan need not point to its own prior
discriminatory practices, but only to conspicuous imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories.155 So long as a private employer can show there
is a "manifest imbalance" related to a "traditionally segregated job
category," a private employer may implement affirmative action policies to
provide assurance that both gender and race will be "taken into account in a
manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of
employment discrimination, and that the interests of those employees not
benefiting from the plan will not be unduly infringed."'
156
The statutory commands of the ADA do not raise constitutional
affirmative action issues, and unlike the predetermined endpoints of
affirmative action plans, the statutory duty of reasonable accommodation
148. Sandra R. Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race: Lessons from the ADA for
Race-Targeted Affirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85, 87 (2000).
149. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
150. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,279 (1986).
151. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003).
152. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204-05 (1979).
153. Id. at 208.
154. Id. at 206-07 (suggesting Congress intended that traditional management prerogatives
be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa
Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding a hiring decision made pursuant to an affirmative
action plan directing that sex or race be considered for purpose of remedying
underrepresentation).
155. Id. at 630.
156. Id. at 632.
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never expires.57 Though the ADA also asks private employers to ignore
disability just as the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII asks employers
to ignore color, race, sex or national origin, the ADA conceives solutions to
the underrepresentation of disability differently than the way the
Constitution and Title VII conceive of race and gender.
First, reasonable accommodation requires an individualized
assessment of an employer's enabling of equal opportunity for disabled
employees, whereas affirmative action is a class-based remedy that does
not require individualized assessments. Conventional affirmative action
programs aim to increase the proportion of a historically discriminated or
underrepresented group by setting predetermined numerical goals or
quotas.1 58 Conversely, reassignment as an accommodation focuses on the
opportunities of individuals already employed by the business, i.e., those
who are not new applicants. Further, reassignment occurs on an
individualized basis. Individualized assessment means the beneficiaries of
the preferential treatment are not fungible or interchangeable simply
because they may also be disabled and therefore part of the same class.
Hence, the individualized nature of the ADA's reasonable accommodation
doctrine requires an analysis of whether the preferential treatment is both
necessary and reasonable given an employer's business practices.
Second, Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of' certain listed
characteristics, such as race or gender.159 This use of an "equal treatment"
approach to discrimination compels employers to make employment
decisions without consideration of a protected trait. Unlike the premise of
Title VII, the ADA uses a different approach to discrimination based on the
trait of "disability." The ADA recognizes that accommodation is required
in order for an employee with a disability to be similarly situated to other
employees. This means that different treatment is sometimes necessary to
"level the playing field"'160 and allow an individual to become similarly
situated to others.
157. Kenneth R. Davis, Undo Hardship: An Argument for Affirmative Action as a Mandatory
Remedy in Systematic Racial Discrimination Cases, 107 DICK. L. REv. 503, 519-20 (2003).
158. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (1996) (describing conventional affirmative
action plans).
159. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also protects against discrimination on the basis of
color, religion, or national origin. Id.
160. See, e.g., Ransom, 983 F. Supp. at 901 (reasoning that the reassignment provision does
not render the ADA an affirmative action statute because it merely levels the playing field
between disabled and nondisabled employees; however the court noted the ADA's purpose of
"reduc[ing] societal costs of dependency and nonproductivity," moves beyond traditional formal
equality arguments for "leveling the field"). Id.
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Third, no employee is at risk of losing employment as a result of
reassignment, because the reassignment is to an already vacant position and
the employer must already employ all applicants for the transfer.' 6'
Traditional affirmative action operates under a pre-hire evaluation,
reserving employment opportunities for an otherwise unemployed
individual on the basis of a protected trait. This hire would be to the
detriment of an unprotected applicant, who may be deprived the
opportunity of being employed. The reassignment provision of the ADA,
on the other hand, operates with the understanding that it can only be used
as a post-hire mechanism. Therefore the residual social costs placed on
nondisabled employees are minimized by the narrow application of the
reassignment provision. 162  For example, an employer may refer to
reassignment to retain the services of a current employee, without
displacing or rejecting employment of another employee as a result of the
job transfer.
Ultimately, the benefits of reasonably accommodating a disabled
individual through mandatory reassignment outweigh the perceived
unfairness. Consider the fates of two employees applying for reassignment
to the same vacant position. One applicant is disabled and the other is
nondisabled. For the disabled employee, reassignment represents a last
resort for a chance at accommodation-the last chance to remain employed
with the employer. The nondisabled applicant, on the other hand, merely
suffers the deferment of an opportunity to work in that vacant position, but
is not threatened by unemployment as a result. The nondisabled employee
remains in his or her current position. The disparity illustrates the
justification for preferential treatment required to level the playing field:
Preferential treatment is required to provide disabled employees with a
meaningful chance of receiving an equal opportunity in the workforce,
which already exists for nondisabled individuals. The nondisabled
workforce is more capable of shouldering residual burden because it's
reasonable to presume that as a whole, they are in a better position to get
another job, transfer to another position that perhaps could not
accommodate disabled employees and receive promotions. The benefit of
continued employment for a disabled individual trumps the minor "loss" of
a nondisabled employee's inability to gain promotion at a given time. For
the disabled employee, the reassignment is necessary to remain employed
with the company. Whereas a disabled employee may have everything to
161. Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act: Answers Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 969 (2003).
162. See generally 42 U.S.C. 12111(10)(A).
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lose if reassignment were optional, a nondisabled employee may only have
something to gain. Accordingly, residual social consequences placed on
nondisabled employees are justified.
Conclusion
The ADA's reassignment provision has been a source of controversy
among the circuit courts, and will likely remain one until the Supreme
Court makes a definitive ruling. Such a ruling should adhere to the ADA's
mandate for preferential treatment in order to provide equality of
opportunity to individuals with disabilities. The reassignment provision in
particular reflects Congressional acceptance of the view that different
treatment may be necessary in order to achieve equality. Treating a
disabled employee "exactly like all other candidates... no better, no
worse" ignores the Supreme Court's statement in Barnett that "preference
will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal
opportunity goal.' 63  Mandatory reassignment is a form of preferential
treatment that simply levels the playing field so that people with disabilities
are no longer disadvantaged by the fact that the workplace ignores their
needs. Moreover, failure to provide preferential treatment through
mandatory reassignment becomes a form of discrimination itself. 164
Until Congress makes explicit, or the Supreme Court makes clear,
disability advocates will be armed with statutory language, Congressional
intent, and majority circuit precedent-all of which indicate that mandatory
reassignment is an appropriate form of preferential treatment to accomplish
basic equality goals of the ADA. Despite the possibility of social
imbalances, the social costs on the nondisabled workforce do not negate the
fundamental drivers behind the ADA's enactment. Accordingly,
Congress's purpose for enacting the ADA need not be muddied by negative
implications of affirmative action.
163. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
164. Ball, supra note 19, at 953.
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